Pakistan’s leaders seem obsessed with being seen on the world stage while their country plunges deeper into political instability and a worsening internal security situation.

Islamabad is blocked off with containers yet again as the opposition threatens to march on the capital. At the same time, another terrorist attack hit KP last week, killing and injuring several policemen and civilians in Kohat. Yet the prime minister appears more interested in his foreign trip than addressing security and political problems at home. The disconnect could not be starker.

While Pakistan tries to mediate in a war with far-reaching global implications, and presents itself as a net security provider to Middle Eastern countries, its own house is becoming more unstable. Over the past few days, scores of PTI workers have been detained in a sweep across Punjab, and the capital has been sealed as the administration braces for protests by the PTI (a planned march by the Jamaat-i-Islami against the hike in petroleum prices has been postponed for now).

These tough measures reflect the insecurity of a government with questionable legitimacy. The all-powerful interior minister has warned the opposition of a “final solution”. Many see his statement as a precursor to a further crackdown on the opposition, even the imposition of governor’s rule in KP. Any such move would render the situation in that province — already in the midst of terrorism — explosive.

A politically stable and economically sound country is what builds an independent policy.

The security situation in both KP and Balochistan is worsening. The Global Terrorism Index 2026, which covers the calendar year 2025, has placed Pakistan at the top of the list of countries hit by terrorism. More than 1,000 civilians and security personnel have reportedly been killed in terrorist attacks in nine months of this year, with July being the deadliest month, when 112 security personnel lost their lives.

One of the deadliest attacks of the year on a police compound in Kohat last week left at least 31 people dead, many of them law enforcers. A day later, six army personnel, including two officers, lost their lives in clashes with militants in the same region. Yet despite claims that hundreds of terrorists have been killed in intelligence-based operations, there has been no let-up in terrorist attacks in the two provinces.

Following the latest attacks in KP, the information ministry said Pakistan had conducted air strikes on terrorist sanctuaries across the border and several terrorists were killed and ammunition depots destroyed. Yet such kinetic action lacks an overarching policy for dealing with the menace of terrorism. Political instability — and a federal government locked in constant confrontation with the KP provincial administration — has given terrorist groups wider space to operate in. Under-equipped civilian law-enforcement agencies on the front line of this existential war have become sitting ducks.

Last week’s attack on the police compound, together with growing casualties among military and civil personnel, has exposed these fault lines in the country’s fight against terrorism. The ever-widening trust gap between the state and the local people, aggravated by a worsening economic situation, has made terrorism far harder to tackle. Yet the state’s priorities appear to lie elsewhere: instead of focusing on fighting terrorism, the interior minister has threatened the KP provincial government with a “final solution”.

The situation in Balochistan is even worse. The state’s writ is non-existent in many parts of the province. Terrorist attacks have increased markedly, while the state insists on the kinetic option rather than seeking a political solution to this festering problem — which gives external forces a chance to fish in troubled waters.

The expanding regional conflict has direct implications for a province near the war zone. The intensification of fighting between Saudi Arabia and Yemen’s Houthi militia could draw Pakistan, which is a part of a trilateral defence alliance, directly into the conflict. Regional instability would have serious spillover effects in the province, given its long coastline.

An unrepresentative provincial government propped up by the establishment and the growing alienation of the population from the state have created a conducive environment for separatist groups to operate in, with external support. Some reports suggest that Iranian insurgent groups operating in the border region — allegedly backed by hostile intel elements — have been reactivated to create disturbances inside Iran’s Sistan-Baluchestan province. For Pakistan, which is trying to end the US-Iran war, this is a challenging situation. Can Islamabad prevent the area from becoming a hub of regional conflict?

The state must put in significant effort to win the confidence of an alienated population. That can happen only by restoring democratic and economic rights to the people in Balochistan. Persecuting those who raise their voices against state excesses and blocking the news won’t solve the problem. The province is sitting on a powder keg — yet there seems to be no sign that the state is prepared to change course.

There is no disagreement over Pakistan’s diplomatic efforts to end the US-Iran war. But they must not divert attention from the dire political and economic situation at home. Foreign policy begins at home; several foreign trips are not a sign of a successful foreign policy. A politically stable and economically sound country is what builds an independent policy. And the spectacle of the capital sealed off with containers does not sit well with Pakistan’s high-profile image on the world stage, however fleeting that image may be.

The writer is an author and journalist.

zhussain100@yahoo.com

X: @hidhussain

Published in Dawn, September 23rd, 2026

The cases of Baloch activist Dr Mahrang Baloch and lawyers Imaan Mazari Hazir and Hadi Ali Chattha are different in their facts and legal foundations. Yet, taken together with the treatment of political opponents and other dissenting voices, they raise a larger question: is the criminal justice system increasingly being used not merely to prosecute alleged offences, but to manage dissent?

Mahrang Baloch emerged as a prominent voice against enforced disappearances and alleged ex­­t­rajudicial killings in Balochistan. In June, an antiterrorism court sentenced her and another activist to life imprisonment in a case arising from the death of a security official during the 2024 Ba­­loch Raji Machi. Amnesty International criticised the proceedings as an expedited secret trial, stating that no direct evidence linking her to the violence had been presented. Her case has consequently become emblematic of wider concerns about due process and the treatment of Baloch dissent.

The state is entitled — indeed obligated — to pro­­secute violence. Human rights advocacy or po­­litical activism cannot confer immunity from cri­minal law. But the converse is equally important: allegations of disloyalty or association with hostile organisations cannot substitute for evidence est­ablishing individual criminal responsibility. The graver the charge, the greater the need for transparent proceedings and scrupulous due process.

Exceptional powers created against today’s adversary may become tomorrow’s weapon against those who created them.

The experience of Imaan Mazari Hazir and her husband, Hadi Ali Chattha, raises another disturbing issue. Both lawyers and human rights activists, they were sentenced in January to 17 years’ imprisonment under multiple provisions of the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act in relation to social media posts. On Sept 17, the Supreme Court suspended their sentences and ordered their release. Within hours, they were arrested in another case and sent back to jail.

Whatever the ultimate merits of that second case, the sequence raises a fundamental rule-of-law concern. If obtaining bail in one case merely opens the door to detention in another, judicial relief risks becoming theoretical. Liberty cannot meaningfully depend upon how many FIRs remain available after a court orders someone’s release. This phenomenon has implications far beyond individual defendants. Arrest becomes punishment before conviction; multiplicity of proceedings becomes a mechanism for prolonged detention; and appellate delay can make eventual acquittal an inadequate remedy. A person who spends years incarcerated before a conviction is overturned cannot be given those years back.

HRCP’s 2025 report described a severe contraction of civic space and raised concerns about erosion of judicial independence. It documented the increasing use of cybercrime, sedition and antiterrorism laws against journalists, political workers, activists and lawyers, alongside continuing repor­ts of enforced disappearances and restrictions on expression.

These developments occur against a persistent public perception that unelected institutions — par­ticularly the security establishment — exerci­­se influence over political and accountability processes. Both the establishment and government have rejected various allegations of political persecution. Such competing claims cannot be reso­l­ved by assertion. That is precisely why visibly in­­d­e­­pendent courts, transparent trials and faithful compliance with judicial orders are irreplaceable.

The controversy surrounding former prime mi­­nister Imran Khan’s medical treatment illustrates the institutional problem. On Aug 18, the Supreme Court ordered that he be shifted to Shifa Inter­national Hospital for examination and treatment, with his personal physician and sister. Instead, he was taken to the government-run Pakistan Institute of Medical Sciences and returned to prison, prompting allegations of non-compliance.

The matter was fixed for Sept 16, but by then, the Federal Constitutional Court had requisitioned the record of the hospital transfer cases. The Supreme Court itself expressed reservations about the FCC’s intervention but, citing judicial comity, adjourned proceedings for three weeks while seeking the attorney general’s assistance on the jurisdictional question. What began as the straightforward issue of compliance with a prisoner’s medical treatment order thus became entangled in a dispute over the jurisdiction of Pakistan’s two apex courts — a development critics view as having shifted attention from the unanswered question: was the original order obeyed?

The issue need not be Imran Khan personally. Tomorrow it may be someone from an entirely different political camp. The constitutional question is whether an order of the highest court binds the executive in practice or merely begins another round of litigation. Montesquieu warned that “there is no liberty” where judicial power is not separated from the other powers of the state. The warning remains strikingly relevant. Courts cannot preserve liberty merely by issuing orders; those orders must command obedience. Pakistan does not need weaker security institutions. It needs stronger constitutional institutions.

Allegations of terrorism, violence and incitem­e­­nt should be prosecuted where evidence exists, but antiterrorism and cybercrime legislation must not become convenient substitutes for ordinary criminal process. Trials involving political activists should be transparent. Appeals involving inc­a­­rcerated defendants require genuinely expedited hearings. Bail and release orders must be im­­plemented in substance, not defeated through serial detention.

Most importantly, enforced disappearance can have no place in a constitutional state. Every person detained by the state must be produced before a court, informed of the accusation and afforded access to counsel.

The government, opposition and establishment should all understand the same principle: exceptional powers created against today’s adversary may become tomorrow’s weapon against those who created them. Pakistan’s crisis, therefore, is larger than Mahrang Baloch, Imaan Mazari Hazir, Hadi Ali Chattha or Imran Khan. It concerns the boundary between the citizen and the state. A criminal justice system earns legitimacy not when it efficiently imprisons the unpopular, but when it protects due process precisely when doing so is politically inconvenient. The ultimate test of the rule of law is simple: whether law restrains power — or power determines what the law will mean. n

The writer is a retired inspector general of police and former DG FIA.

Published in Dawn, September 23rd, 2026

“Frequent marches on Islamabad severely disrupt the lives of citizens,” said the party’s Secretary General Nayyer Hussain Bukhari in a statement on Tuesday.

“Whether it is May 9 or Nov 26, the people ultimately suffer,” he added.

Political clashes, he said, at the cost of the country and its people were unacceptable.

Urges govt, political parties to avoid confrontation over Sept 27 protest

“The government and the opposition must show mercy to the people and resolve political issues through dialogue,” Mr Bukhari said.

He said repeated marches and confrontations in Islamabad severely affected the lives of citizens and disrupted normal economic and social activities.

He said that, whether it was May 9 or November 26, ordinary people were ultimately forced to face difficulties and disruptions.

“Political confrontation and violence at the cost of the country and its people are unacceptable,” he added.

Mr Bukhari urged both the government and the opposition to show consideration for the people and focus on political stability, economic development and resolution of public issues.

He said the prevailing circumstances demand that both sides demonstrate political maturity and prioritise the national interest.

The PPP leader said the government and opposition should abandon stubbornness and adopt the path of dialogue. “Political issues cannot be resolved through confrontation, force or agitation; they must be addressed through negotiations and constitutional and democratic means,” he added.

Mr Bukhari said Pakistan was neither a monarchy nor could a monarchical system function in the country.

“Pakistan must be governed according to the Constitution, law and democratic principles,” he said.

Expressing concern over rising petroleum prices, he said it was surprising that petrol prices in Pakistan were increasing day by day despite declining prices in the international market.

The increase in petroleum prices and inflation have made life extremely difficult for the poor.

“The government must take effective measures to provide relief to the public,” he demanded.

Mr Bukhari said under the Constitution, the federal government could seek assistance from the provinces, including police personnel when required.

“The Constitution provides a framework for cooperation between the federation and the provinces, and constitutional procedures should be followed,” he added.

“Nelson Mandela was released as a result of negotiations, not by breaking out of prison. The political challenges in Pakistan should likewise be addressed through dialogue, the Constitution and parliament,” he said.

Published in Dawn, September 23rd, 2026

GILGIT: The Agence Française de Développement (AFD), Gilgit-Baltistan (GB) government, Euro­pean Union (EU) and Aga Khan Foundation (AKF) on Tuesday launched a €54.24 million (Rs17.2 billion) project to strengthen climate resilience and improve living conditions across the region.

The Gilgit-Baltistan Rural Devel­opment and Climate Resilience (GBRDCR) project, supported through AFD financing, an EU grant, AKF funding and community contributions, will focus on climate-resilient infrastructure, basic services, renewable energy and institutional development.

The agreement was signed at the GB Chief Minister’s Secretariat by Additional Chief Secretary Riaz Ahmed, AFD Country Director Marc-Antoine Leclercq and AKF CEO Akhtar Iqbal.

CM Amjad Hussain, EU Ambas­sador to Pakistan Raimundas Karo­blis, Senior Minister Mohammad Ali Akhtar and Local Government Minister Zulfiqar Ali Murad also attended the ceremony.

The initiative will cover all districts of GB and include 216 water and sanitation schemes, which include 117 drinking-water supply schemes and 30 sanitation projects.

Hydropower initiatives are exp­e­c­ted to generate 1,200-1,300kW of cle­an energy. The project will also conduct vulnerability assessments acr­oss all 110 union councils, green-retrofit 3,000 households and support energy-efficient, resilient construction for another 700 households.

Training will be provided in climate-smart planning, enterprise development and sustainable infrastructure management. The project is expected to reach around 43,200 households, or 325,600 people, with women accounting for at least 40 per cent of beneficiaries.

Community participation

GB Chief Minister Amjad Hus­sain, addressing the ceremony, said the project would be an important milestone for sustainable development and protecting communities from the effects of climate change.

Energy master plan

During the event, Northern Pakistan Energy Limited (NPak Energy) presented key findings of the Gilgit-Baltistan Energy Master Plan, a 30-year roadmap developed under the EU-funded €31m (Rs9.8bn) Energy Plus project.

The plan seeks to establish a reliable, affordable and climate-resilient energy system while addressing the region’s power deficit and exploi­ting its renewable-energy potential.

EU Ambassador Raimundas Karoblis described the launch as a significant step towards a sustainable and resilient future for GB.

AFD Country Director Marc-Antoine Leclercq said the project would improve basic services and strengthen the GB government’s institutional capacity to implement community-driven development, particularly in remote areas.

Published in Dawn, September 23rd, 2026

Informed sources said several proposals were being considered to determine the modalities for implementing the inter-provincial rotation of judges of Islamabad’s district judiciary.

One proposal under consideration is that judicial officers posted to other provinces should preferably be sent to the province from where they originally belong. The Islamabad judiciary comprises officers who joined the service through different modes, including initial appointments, absorption and deputation, and judicial officers from all four provinces are currently serving in the capital.

The sources said there were around 60 judicial officers in the Islamabad judiciary, and the authorities were considering whether all of them, 50pc of them or one-third should be rotated to other provinces.

Another issue under consideration is whether the rotation should cover all tiers of the subordinate judiciary — civil judges, senior civil judges, additional district and sessions judges and district and sessions judges — or be limited to certain categories.

“Whatever formula is adopted, one thing is clear: the equal number of judges sent from Islamabad will be brought in from the provinces to maintain the strength of the district judiciary,” a legal expert familiar with the proposed mechanism said.

The proposed policy follows a longstanding demand by Islamabad’s lawyers for giving the district judiciary of the federal capital the same opportunity for inter-provincial transfers and rotations available to judges in the provinces.

In May, the Islamabad High Court Bar Association formally demanded a uniform transfer and rotation policy for the district judiciary.

The NJPMC subsequently accepted the demand in principle and decided to introduce inter-provincial rotation of Islamabad’s subordinate judiciary. The move came after years of calls from the legal fraternity for greater institutional balance in the capital’s district courts.

The issue has gained further significance following the transfer of three IHC judges to the Lahore, Peshawar and Sindh high courts earlier this year. Bar bodies had subsequently called for a structured and periodic rotation mechanism for judges rather than selective transfers.

The concept of rotating Islamabad’s lower court judges is not new. In 2018, the federal government had proposed amendments to the Islamabad Judicial Service Rules to enable subordinate court judges to be sent on deputation to other provinces, while noting that the existing rules did not provide for such transfers.

The proposed mechanism has, however, also generated apprehensions among some judicial officers. Concerns have been expressed that frequent movement between Islamabad and other provinces could expose judges to new forms of professional pressure, including attempts by lawyers to influence judicial decisions or pressure judges considered “non-cooperative”.

The authorities are therefore faced with the task of devising a transparent and uniform mechanism that provides for inter-provincial exposure and rotation while safeguarding judicial independence and ensuring that the strength of Islamabad’s district judiciary remains intact.

The final policy is expected to settle the number and categories of judges to be rotated, the duration of their postings and the procedure for replacing them with judicial officers from other provinces.

Published in Dawn, September 23rd, 2026

ISLAMABAD: In two significant interim orders drawing a distinction between professional discipline and the pursuit of education, a medical tribunal on Tuesday allowed two postgraduate doctors, who face two-year suspension of their medical licences, to continue postgraduate training and appear in their forthcoming final examinations, while their appeals against disciplinary action remain pending.

The three-member tribunal, headed by retired Justice Safdar Saleem Shahid, granted identical interim relief to Dr Tayyaba Fatima Toor and Dr Muhammad Essa, suspending the operation of the Pakistan Medical and Dental Council disciplinary order dated July 28, 2026, but only to the extent necessary to enable them to continue and complete their postgraduate academic and training programmes and appear in their final postgraduate examinations.

The tribunal was careful, however, not to disturb the disciplinary findings at this stage or restore an unrestricted licence to practise medicine. It expressly clarified that the interim arrangement was provisional, subject to the final outcome of the appeals, and did not amount to an adjudication permitting the appellants to undertake independent clinical practice.

The two doctors were among five postgraduate trainees whose cases attracted considerable attention following the circulation of what became known as the “OT video leak scandal” at Lahore’s Lady Willingdon Hospital.

In April this year, the PMDC had publicly stated that five doctors — Dr Tayyaba Fatima Toor, Dr Zainab Tahir, Dr Muhammad Essa, Dr Ayesha Afzal and Dr Maham Amin — had appeared in preliminary proceedings concerning a video circulating on social media. The council subsequently referred the matter to its Disciplinary Committee for final determination.

The disciplinary proceedings eventually resulted in the suspension of the medical registration licences of the appellants for two years. That decision is now under challenge before the Medical Tribunal, and Tuesday’s orders concern only the doctors’ applications for interim relief, rather than the merits of their appeals.

“Material distinction”

At the centre of the tribunal’s reasoning is a distinction likely to have wider relevance for disciplinary proceedings involving doctors who are simultaneously postgraduate trainees.

The tribunal held that there was a “material distinction” between permission to pursue an academic programme and appear in an examination, on the one hand, and permission independently to practise medicine under a professional licence, on the other.

The former, it observed, could, in an appropriate case, be protected provisionally without finally determining the latter.

The distinction enabled the tribunal to preserve the regulatory authority of the PMDC while ensuring that the pendency of an appeal did not itself cause academic consequences that could become irreversible before the legality of the disciplinary action had been finally determined.

According to the orders, counsel informed the tribunal that the appellants had already substantially completed their prescribed postgraduate training and cleared the requisite intermediate or mid-term component. Their final postgraduate examinations were stated to be due in approximately four months.

The tribunal observed that if the doctors were prevented from completing the remaining academic component and consequently missed their forthcoming examinations, success in their appeals at a later stage might not adequately restore the academic opportunity already lost.

Conversely, it held, permitting them provisionally to continue their academic programmes and sit the examinations would neither determine the validity of the disciplinary proceedings nor confer an unconditional right to practice medicine during the pendency of their appeals.

The cases will now proceed on their merits before the medical tribunal.

Published in Dawn, September 23rd, 2026