After the court’s original order was disregarded by the government, like so many others before it, the matter landed before the Federal Constitutional Court via a separate case filed by three other Adiala inmates seeking similar treatment. The FCC has since taken control of the Imran Khan hospitalisation case as well, much to the SC’s chagrin.

To observers, the FCC’s move directly challenges a May ruling issued by Chief Justice of Pakistan Yahya Afridi, in which he had described the SC and FCC as “coordinate courts exercising clearly demarcated jurisdictions over distinct matters”. However, the current dispute underlines a clear jurisdictional collision between the two courts, which still seem rather uncertain regarding what each is supposed to be doing since the 27th Amendment.

At the heart of the crisis is the 27th Amendment, which had substantially rearranged constitutional jurisdiction by creating a completely new judicial forum, the FCC, and placing major constitutional questions and fundamental rights matters within its domain. The FCC invoked that same jurisdiction days ago to summon the complete records of cases concerning Mr Khan’s hospital transfer from the SC, indicating that it intended to frame the matter as a question of determining whether prisoners are constitutionally entitled to such treatment.

However, it then went a step further and also fixed the case before itself. To its credit, the SC has responded with restraint. The three-member bench hearing the case merely remarked that the FCC’s order had raised “considerable legal and constitutional significance” and then adjourned for three weeks while seeking comment from the attorney general over whether the FCC’s order was, indeed, binding on the SC. Mr Khan’s hospitalisation, of course, seems moot at this point.

Perhaps matters were bound to arrive at this juncture thanks to the undue haste with which the 27th Amendment was foisted upon the nation. It appears that its text never settled the matter of what happens when a constitutional question arises in an ongoing SC case, especially when such a case pertains to the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Contempt of Court Ordinance, which are very much within the SC’s remit.

It is even more remarkable that a crisis of this nature has erupted at the highest level of the judiciary over what was otherwise a rather straightforward order to transfer an ailing prisoner to a hospital and get them the treatment required. It is certainly not a good look for the current dispensation that the fragility of the architecture that props it up keeps being exposed, and over matters that ought to be minor in perspective.

Published in Dawn, September 18th, 2026

A similarly stated motivation for the merger was given at the time — the utter collapse of the old Fata governance system. That system has been blamed for the militant takeover in many parts of Fata (now called the merged districts). Many also hold it responsible for erstwhile Fata’s extremely poor human development indices compared to the Pakistani average. The merger with KP, and thus the extension of KP’s institutional structures, laws, and systems, was deemed necessary to resolve Fata’s problems. Another proclaimed benefit was that the merger would bring the government closer to the public. The state believed that the militants had filled the void created by an unresponsive government. So, in many ways, the motivation to merge rested on two beliefs: first, to replace an old, collapsed system with one offering better governance; and second, to involve communities in decision-making by bringing government closer to them. Similar justifications are now being touted to support the idea of new provinces.

Eight years after the merger, the question is: how effectively has the change improved both aspects for residents of the merged areas? The question of whether decision-making has been brought closer to the people and thereby made government institutions more responsive to the public’s needs is perhaps the easier one to answer: there’s no evidence that matters have improved; if anything, the opposite appears to be true. The merged areas still have no share in the NFC and continue to depend on discretionary federal funding. In fact, they are a step removed from that planning process, as it must come through KP rather than directly to them. Similarly, the tribal system is, by definition, participatory and community-led. Replacing it with a more centralised, institutional state structure has decreased community involvement and the power of the local people to run their own affairs.

The question of governance is more complex, but even here, there is not much improvement. First, the new system is less participatory even in governance, further alienating people from their government. Second, the administrative system is now far too bureaucratic to respond promptly. It is increasingly bloated — current administrative expenditures for the merged areas have more than doubled, from about Rs50 billion at the time of the merger to over Rs100bn now. Similarly, the judicial process, like elsewhere in the country, is painfully slow, making locals increasingly likely to turn to traditional jirgas rather than the courts. The creation of alternative dispute resolution me­­chanisms and dispute resolution councils, aligned with traditional jirgas and under the guise of the district administration and district police respectively, acknowledges the delay in dispensing justice. Worse, there has been no marked improvement in any human development indicator; apart from isolated instances, no real examples of systemic improvement in service delivery exist. Where security is concerned, there is a surge in militant activity in the region, with terrorist incidents and casualty figures worse than in the years before the merger. Clearly, the merger is not preventing the resurgence of militancy in the area.

What insights does the Fata merger offer into the recently proposed move to create new administrative units?

The merger failed to achieve the improvements that proponents vowed it would bring, even though it had backing at the national level, unlike the idea of new provinces, especially from the three major national political parties (the PML-N, PTI and PPP), establishment experts and development partners. It was a rare moment in Pakistan’s recent political history in which all three major national parties came together to pass the 25th Constitutional Amendment and then saw it passed in the KP Assembly by consensus. The idea of new provinces has no such national consensus at the moment; it would look more like arm-twisting if the political parties go ahead with it. However, even in the case of the merger, locals were excluded from the decision-making process, and a majority of Fata’s elected parliamentarians at the time favoured reforms, though they raised serious reservations about how these reforms were being pursued. This was cause for concern. Regrettably, their alarm was disregarded; in fact, it was termed a vain effort by locals to save an archaic system.

One might argue that the merger was, in many ways, a different reform than creating new provinces. Yet both reforms ignore the same basic issue of structure and approach, which must be addressed before there is any redrawing of internal provincial borders or creation of new administrative units. To have a responsive government, communities need more involvement through a regularly functioning, well-resourced local government system. Helping communities decide the policies they want is essential for a successful transition to new systems. Whether this happens in a larger administrative unit or a smaller one matters less.

Most importantly, Pakistan needs a mindset shift in how it pursues policy and reforms. We need an approach that replaces preconceived notions and unsubstantiated beliefs that dictate policy. We must move away from a mindset that envisions the state as a mere administrative entity; instead, the state must assume the role of a citizen-empowering force that serves the people. Without this, even the most logical ‘reforms’ will prove cosmetic and do little to address systemic failures.

The writer is a development practitioner and a former parliamentarian.

X: @GhaziGJ

Published in Dawn, September 18th, 2026

In the past 200 years, Japan, South Korea, and China stand as the only non-European nations to have bridged the economic divide with the West. These countries accomplished in decades what the West achieved in centuries by sustaining long periods of nearly double-digit economic growth.

After the destruction wreaked by World War II, Japan grew at an average annual rate of nearly 10pc from 1955 to 1973. In 1968, it surpassed Germany to become the second largest economy. Starting in the early 1960s, South Korea entered a period of sustained economic growth, described as the ‘Miracle on the Han River’. Real GDP increased 25-fold in three decades. In 1996, South Korea became a member of the OECD. In the 40 years following the ‘reform and opening up’ of 1978, China’s economy grew at an average annual rate of about 9.5pc, increasing the size of its GDP roughly 35- to 40-fold in real terms. In the process, China lifted nearly 800 million people out of poverty and became the world’s largest economy in PPP terms in 2014.

The high-speed economic growth of the East Asian economies displayed three characteristics. First, the period of rapid economic growth was preceded by fundamental restructuring of society’s political and cultural institutions. Second, the shift from an agricultural to industrial economy was spearheaded by the state. Third, during the transformation period, the attainment of econo­m­­ic goals was prioritised over political freedoms.

For Pakistanis to live better, the economy must grow at near double-digit rates for decades.

From 1945 until 1951, Gen Douglas MacArthur presided over Japan’s post-World War II transformation as supreme commander of the allied powers. He had Emperor Hirohito issue a rescript denouncing his divinity, promulgated a new constitution, carried out land reforms, changed the education system, and introduced American cultural elements to Japanese life. In South Korea, before Gen Park seized power in 1961, land reforms had already been accomplished through the initiative of the United States Army Military Government in Korea. Gen Park launched the New Community Movement, promoted traditional ethno-nationalism, and strictly regulated social life. During the first 30 years after the revolution of 1949, the Communist Party of China dismantled the 2,000-year-old imperial system, gave land title to nearly 300m peasants, and laid the foundations of a modern state.

The post-World War II reconstruction in Japan was led by the ‘iron triangle’ of bureaucrats from the trade and industry ministry, Liberal Democratic Party politicians, and the captains of Japan’s leading industrial conglomerates. In South Korea, Gen Park adopted the policy of export-led economic growth by providing subsidised credit to chaebols, suppressing domestic demand, and quashing labour unions. In China, the state laid the foundations of basic and heavy industry through financial and technical Soviet assistance. Even after Deng Xiaoping’s liberalisation, the state still controls strategic sectors of the economy and takes the lead in pioneering new technologies.

Nominally, Japan was a parliamentary democracy during the post-World War II economic tra­n­s­­formation, but the Liberal Democratic Party re­­mained in power for 38 years in what is described as a ‘one-and-a-half party system’. Following a coup in 1961, Gen Park first ruled South Korea as a military dictator and then adopted a constitution giving him near absolute powers without term limits. China has remained a one-party-led state since its founding in 1949. Deng Xiaoping, who launched the economic ‘reform and opening up’ in 1978, rejected dem­ands for Western-style democracy and suppressed the 1989 demonstrations in Tiananmen Square.

In varying degrees, these conditions were present in all countries that successfully transformed into industrialised nations. Pakistan experienced something similar during its first two decades, when it attempted land reforms, passed the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, and adopted the five-year planning system, with input from the Harvard Advisory Group. All the economic and social gains of these early decades were lost starting in the 1970s. In 1998, Pakistan discontinued the practice of drawing five-year plans and began transitioning to a medium-term development framework. Slow growth in the last two decades has caused Pakistan to fall behind its South Asian neighbours in living standards. The manufacturing sector represents less than 13pc of GDP, and the country runs an average annual trade deficit of around $30 billion.

Harsh policy measures have stabilised Pakistan’s economy. During FY2024-2025, Pakistan recorded a current account surplus because of import restrictions and robust remittances. Fiscal deficit dropped to a multi-decade low of 2.6pc of GDP in 2025-26. Record-high inflation has come down to more manageable levels. Pakistan’s sovereign credit rating has improved because of lower external risks. However, growth has remained stagnant at around 3.5pc per annum for the last decade. The IMF projects an annual growth rate of 3.5pc for 2026-27, which is barely sufficient to offset the depreciation of the capital stock and compensate for population growth.

For Pakistanis to experience any meaningful improvement in living standards, the economy needs to grow at near double-digit rates for several decades. Our current subsistence level agricultural economy with a rudimentary level of industrialisation has reached the limits of its productive capacity. Transformative growth can only come by making the quantum leap to industry. However, industrialisation requires us to fundamentally restructure the political and social order of society, and the state should lead the industrialisation process, with political differences subordinated to the pursuit of economic goals. The poverty trap will not be broken by incremental policy reforms. It requires restructuring the entire system of society.

The writer has a background in public administration. He has worked with international financial institutions, including the World Bank.

Published in Dawn, September 18th, 2026

“Qatar and the UAE together supply about 99pc of Pakistan’s LNG — mostly for power generation, fertiliser production and industrial use. LNG accounts for about 30pc of total gas supply,” said the Gastech Conferences in its report ‘The Outlook for Gas and LNG Markets in Asia’ released at its 54th annual event.

It said that beyond addressing immediate challenges, policymakers in Asia may now be reviewing how to future-proof domestic energy and power systems with renewed focus on energy security. This could be done by accelerating renewables, such as swift-build, utility-scale solar, wind farms and commercial rooftop solar, plus storage deployment.

They would also be looking at speeding up investment in long-term infrastructure, including gas storage and updating power generation mixes and giving gas plants better flexibility.

Gastech report notes US-Iran war has redrawn global energy maps

This is where Pakistan’s Universal Gas Distribution Company (UGDC) held discussions with several international firms on potential projects, including gas storage, long-term LNG supplies and gas distribution in overseas markets, its Chief Executive Officer Ghiyas Abdullah Paracha said.

The Gastech report said the countries were also examining options for expanding operating reserves to ensure grid agility for unexpected events and rethinking fuel stockpiles by expanding strategic stocks for transport fuels and power generation. The nations may also be looking at boosting cross-border power export/import options to share shortages.

The report said the Middle East’s fluid landscape — as demonstrated by the conflict involving Israel, the United States and Iran which began in February and the resultant bottleneck in the Strait of Hormuz — has redrawn global energy maps in real time and further highlighted the geopolitical sensitivity of gas and LNG markets.

Gastech noted that gas supply disruptions have prompted Pakistan’s government to look to coal, hydropower, and nuclear power, while price volatility and shipping uncertainty are likely to sharply increase power costs.

Ghiyas Paracha told journalists that his company received a greater-than-anticipated response at the conference. “We have got understanding with some companies that have shown interest in building gas storage facilities in Pakistan. Some companies have shown keen interest in long-term LNG contracts with UGDC,” Paracha said.

Paracha said UGDC’s participation at Gastech was also significant because the company was presenting Pakistan’s gas-sector reforms and the opening of the country’s gas market to private-sector participation at an international energy forum.

Published in Dawn, September 18th, 2026

According to the Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR), an intelligence-based operation was carried out in North Waziristan after reports of the presence of terrorists in the area. Security forces effectively targeted their hideout, killing six khwarij belonging to Indian-sponsored Fitna al-Khawarij in an intense exchange of fire.

The state uses the term Fitna al-Khawarij for the banned Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP).

In another clash in Hangu, four terrorists were killed.

Military’s media wing says six soldiers martyred in IED blast

On Sept 17, an IED struck a security forces convoy, resulting in the martyrdom of six soldiers, according to the ISPR.

Weapons and ammunition were recovered from the terrorists killed in the operations, the ISPR stated. It added that the slain men were involved in several terrorist activities in these areas.

Awaran operation

Separately, security for­ces killed three terrorists in an intelligence-based operation in the Badrang area of Balo­chistan’s Awaran district.

A large quantity of weapons and ammunition was recovered from the possession of the terrorists of Fitna al Hindustan, according to security sources.

Fitna al Hindustan is a term designated by the state for terrorist organisations in Balochistan.

Published in Dawn, September 18th, 2026

On January 24, an Islamabad sessions court sentenced Imaan and Hadi to a total of 17 years in jail on multiple charges under the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act (Peca). The convictions of the couple, who had already been jailed the day before in a separate case, were widely condemned by lawyers and United Nations (UN) experts.

Islamabad ATC Judge Abul Hasnat Muhammad Zulqarnain passed the order after the two accused were produced before the court for a hearing in a case registered against them at Kohsar police station.

Soon after their release, Islamabad police personnel, led by the SSP Operations, reached Adiala jail and arrested the two again in connection with the case. The police subsequently produced them before the ATC late at night.

Former federal minister Shireen Mazari confirmed the development, saying attempts were being made to keep the couple in jail.

Speaking to Dawn, Imaan’s counsel Riasat Ali Azad also confirmed the development, saying a large contingent of Islamabad police had shifted the couple to Kohsar police station.

The case at the federal capital’s Kohsar police station was registered on March 22, 2025, on the complaint of City Magistrate Ghulam Murtaza Chandio.

Imaan and her husband were accused of chanting anti-government slogans and blocking roads and were nominated by name in the FIR. However, at the time of registration of the case, no section of the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA) had been added.

The FIR included Section 188 (disobedience of an order lawfully promulgated by a public servant), Section 341 (wrongful restraint), Section 506 (punishment for criminal intimidation), Section 353 (assault or use of criminal force to deter a public servant from discharging their official duty) and Section 186 (obstructing a public servant in the performance of official duties).

SC suspends sentences

Earlier today, the apex court suspended the couple’s sentences in the controversial social media posts case after a two-judge SC bench, headed by Justice Naeem Akhtar Afghan and Justice Ishtiaq Ibrahim, took up the couple’s appeals against the Islamabad High Court’s (IHC) refusal in February to suspend the sentences.

On Thursday, the SC granted the couple bail against surety bonds of Rs200,000 and ordered their release pending the IHC’s final verdict.

“Both are lawyers and we are keeping their honour,” observed Justice Afghan, but also asked senior counsel Faisal Siddiqui, the couple’s lawyer, to tell the appellants to observe the court’s decorum.

“There is a difference between a lawyer and an ordinary person,” the judge observed.

According to a written order, the SC converted the petitions of both Imaan and Hadi into appeals and suspended the operation of the January 24 conviction.

The court also ordered the release of petitioners — noting they were practising advocates — on bail till the decision of their pending appeals before IHC. The release was subject to furnishing personal surety bonds worth Rs200,000 for each with the SC’s additional registrar (judicial).

The SC will issue a detailed verdict on the case later.

Earlier, the SC had repeatedly adjourned hearings in the case on the grounds that the IHC had fixed their application for suspension of sentence along with the main appeal.

During Thursday’s hearing, Siddiqui argued that the SC had issued its first order on May 12 in which the IHC was asked to decide the applicants’ petition for suspension of sentence as expeditiously as possible, preferably within a period of two weeks.

On May 12, the SC ordered the IHC to decide Imaan and Hadi’s sentence suspension pleas within two weeks. Despite the May 26 deadline having already passed, the National Cyber Crime Investigation Agency (NCCIA) challenged the SC order and sought its withdrawal.

During the proceedings, Siddiqui also read out the order sheets from various IHC hearings.

At one point, the SC directed Additional Attorney General (AAG) Rana Asadullah Khan, who was standing at the rostrum, to take a seat, adding that the court will hear Siddiqui first.

“Let him sit, though he has certainly worn us out,” Siddiqui quipped and cited former chief justice Asif Saeed Khosa’s remarks that a case would only be adjourned upon the death of a judge or a lawyer.

The counsel regretted that the IHC adjourned the case multiple times and that his clients’ request for an early hearing was rejected by the high court’s registrar office.

“What transpired at the high court came as a surprise to us,” the counsel said.

“These days are an era of surprises,” remarked Justice Ibrahim.

During the hearing, the AAG contended that the IHC has not yet issued any adverse ruling, adding that seven opportunities were provided in the trial court.

He highlighted that the judicial forum for the suspension of a sentence under Section 426 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) was the high court.

Justice Afghan observed that the IHC always cited the SC directives for early disposal of the case but does not act upon them.

The judge also asked AAG Khan whether he would give any assurance that proceedings would be held at the next IHC hearing, to which the latter replied that he cannot represent any high court judge in the SC.

Later, the SC suspended the sentence of the applicants and ordered their release on bail, pending the IHC’s final verdict.

In their applications, the applicants had stated that it was a settled policy of the SC that criminal matters have to be given priority, especially when the matters pertain to bail or suspension of sentence.

Moreover, in Section 7 of the Supreme Court (Practice and Procedure) Act, 2023, it was expressly stated that any application pleading urgency shall be fixed for hearing within a period of 14 days.

The application contended that Imaan was a young female lawyer and has remained incarcerated for a long period of time in a case where conviction was the “result of a sham trial”.

The case

Imaan and Hadi have been in jail since their arrest on January 23 in a case registered against them for protesting outside the IHC and allegedly manhandling the IHC Bar Association (IHCBA) president. The arrest prompted criticism by rights bodies, politicians and journalists, who stressed the couple’s right to a fair trial.

Just a day later, a sessions court convicted Imaan and Hadi in the social media posts case.

It sentenced the duo to 10 years’ imprisonment under Section 10 (cyber terrorism), five years’ imprisonment under Section 9 (glorification of an offence) and two years’ imprisonment under Section 26-A (false and fake information) of Peca.

All sentences were to run concurrently.

The case stemmed from a complaint filed on Aug 12, 2025 by the assistant director (investigating officer) at the NCCIA Islamabad, before the Federal Investigation Agency’s Cybercrime Reporting Centre.

The complaint accused Imaan of disseminating and “propagating narratives that align with hostile terrorist groups and proscribed organisations”, while her husband was implicated for reposting some of her posts.

The first information report (FIR) in the case alleged that the two held security forces responsible for cases of missing persons in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan.

It also stated that they had portrayed the armed forces as ineffective against proscribed groups, including the banned outfits Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) and the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP).

Judge Majoka had indicted Imaan and Hadi in the case on Oct 30, 2025 and issued arrest warrants for the couple on Nov 5, 2025. The judge then reissued arrest warrants for them in January after repeated non-appearances.

After being convicted, the couple challenged the sentences by filing separate appeals in the IHC on February 7. Taking up those appeals and sentence suspension pleas on February 19, the IHC issued notices to the respondents but refused to suspend the sentences.

On April 30, Imaan and Hadi moved a separate appeal before the SC against the IHC’s February order. They sought an early hearing of the plea in June, after which notices were issued on July 6.

After the SC’s intervention, the IHC finally declared the jailed couple’s pleas seeking suspension of sentences as admissible on July 25. Days later, Imaan moved the SC again seeking an early hearing of the challenge against the IHC order.

Additional input by Mohammad Asghar

ISLAMABAD: Pakistan on Thursday expressed concern over the “exceptionally serious” situation around the Bab al-Mandab Strait and reaffirmed its commitments to Saudi Arabia’s security, but stressed that the Houthi conflict should be addressed through dialogue and diplomacy rather than through coercive means.

Speaking at the weekly media briefing, Foreign Office spokesperson Sajjad Haider Khan said Islamabad was concerned about the widening conflict and the threat it posed to regional stability and maritime security.

“The situation in the Bab al-Mandab is exceptionally serious and a matter of concern, and we need to bring peace to the entire region,” he said.

His comments came as fighting between Saudi Arabia and Yemen’s Houthis has intensified, with the group making gains along Yemen’s Red Sea coast near the strategic waterway and launching missile and drone attacks on Saudi territory, while Riyadh stepped up airstrikes against Houthi positions.

The escalation has raised wider concerns because Bab al-Mandab is a major maritime chokepoint connecting the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden and is critical to commercial shipping and energy supplies.

Mr Khan suggested that Pakistan’s approach to the conflict was to seek an end to hostilities rather than become part of an expanding military confrontation.

“The Houthis must also stop their activities, and in this regard, our discussions basically revolve around bringing peace and stability through dialogue and diplomacy, and not through coercive measures,” he said.

These remarks were particularly significant in view of Pakistan’s growing defence commitments to Saudi Arabia especially the Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement (SMDA) and the recently signed Makkah Joint Defence Agreement, which besides Pakistan and Saudi Arabia also involved Turkiye.

Pakistan and Saudi Arabia signed the SMDA in September 2025, under which aggression against either country is to be treated as aggression against both.

The Makkah agreement, signed by the three countries in August this year, similarly provides for collective defence while being presented by its signatories as a defensive arrangement aimed at strengthening regional security and deterrence.

Asked how Islamabad viewed its commitments under the two agreements amid the Houthi attacks, Mr Khan said Pakistan remained committed to both arrangements. “Paki­stan is committed, in intent and spirit, to implementing the SMDA as well as the Makkah Joint Defence Agreement,” he said.

He nevertheless declined to disclose how Pakistan might respond operationally, saying such decisions involved matters of confidentiality.

“However, when, how, where, and what force will be used against which objectives, in which modes, and other matters involving operational confidentiality req­u­­ire us to maintain some discretion at this stage,” he said.

Pakistan has already maintained military personnel and defence assets in Saudi Arabia, with the two countries having long standing military cooperation that predates the SMDA. Mr Khan confirmed that some deployments had taken place under the bilateral agreement but declined to provide details.

“On the SMDA, there were some deployments of forces, and since it is an operational matter, I would not comment beyond that,” he said. “SMDA is operational, and the two countries are working at their respective competent levels.”

About the Makkah Agree­ment, the spokesperson said, “Makkah Joint Defence Agreement is a Mutual Defence Agreement aimed at strengthening regional peace and stability.” “The Makkah Accord, in essence, formalises and further strengthens many aspects of the ongoing cooperation and existing long-term bilateral cooperation among these three countries.”

Assurances needed from Kabul

Talking about Afghanistan, the FO spokesperson stressed the need for verifiable assurances that its territory would not be used for terrorism against Pakistan, recalling that previous mediation efforts involving Chi­na, Turkiye and Qatar had failed to produce the desired results because of Kabul’s reluctance to cooperate.

“Pakistan is keen to resolve all our issues through pea­ceful means, of course, through dialogue and diplomacy. We have clearly mentioned our red line, and now it is for Afghanistan to see how it can stop terrorism, be­­­c­­ause you cannot continuously allow terrorists to flow fr­­­­om the Afghan side and then expect a different outcome from Pakistan’s side,” Mr Khan said at the briefing.

He was responding to questions about recent visits by senior Turkish and Qatari security officials to Afghanistan and the subsequent arrival in Islamabad of Turkiye’s intelligence chief Ibrahim Kalin.

The visits have been viewed as a renewed effort to ease tensions between Pakistan and Afghanistan, although Islamabad officially said it was not aware of the background or specific purpose of the latest initiative.

“We are not aware of the background in which this visit is taking place,” Mr Khan said, while acknowledging the previous role played by the two countries in mediating between Islamabad and Kabul.

Qatar and Turkiye had previously hosted separate rounds of Pakistan-Afghanistan talks, including meetings in Doha and Istanbul, as the two sides then sought to contain hostilities between the two over cross-border militancy, border closures and trade disruptions.

“If you remember, last year, we engaged with Afghanistan twice through these mediatory platforms once in Qatar and, secondly, in Istanbul,” Mr Khan said.

Mr Khan said the problem with previous initiatives had been Kabul’s failure to provide the assurances Islamabad was seeking.

“So, for Pakistan, it is very important that this assurance is provided.” He also recalled the Urumqi process, through which China brought Pakistan and Afghanistan together in an effort to facilitate dialogue and improve relations.

Mr Khan nevertheless indicated that Islamabad was prepared to move quickly toward normal relations if the security issue was resolved. “If they cooperate on terrorism, there is no reason for Pakistan to continue with this process,” he said.

Published in Dawn, September 18th, 2026